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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA CASES STRENGTHEN
ARGUMENT FOR MUNICIPAL OBLIGATION TO
DISCHARGE DUTY TO CONSULT:
TIME TO PUT NESKONLITH TO REST
ANGELA D’ELIA DECEMBRINI* AND SHIN IMAI**
Can municipalities infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights without consulting the affected
Indigenous group? In Neskonlith Indian Band v. Salmon Arm (City),1 the British Columbia
Court of Appeal answered this question in the affirmative, finding that the city of Salmon
Arm did not need to consult the Neskonlith First Nation about impacts from the construction
of a shopping mall. In what was technically obiter dicta, the Court permitted the municipal
project to proceed, and told the First Nation that its only recourse was to complain to the
provincial government in a separate proceeding.
In 2014, Shin Imai and Ashley Stacey in “Municipalities and the Duty to Consult
Aboriginal Peoples: A Case Comment on Neskonlith Indian Band v. Salmon Arm (City)”2
argued that the case was wrongly decided in law and was unworkable in practice. Seven
years after the decision, in 2019, these predictions seem to have come true. The legal
reasoning in Neskonlith has been undermined in two decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada dealing with the role of the National Energy Board (NEB) in discharging the
Crown’s duty to consult.3 These cases have confirmed that any project that may impact
Aboriginal or treaty rights cannot go ahead unless there is appropriate consultation and
accommodation. If the entity empowered to give the green light to the project cannot satisfy
the consultation and accommodation required, then the Crown must step in to ensure that the
duty to consult is fulfilled.
As for practice on the ground, Neskonlith seems to have been largely ignored. Rather than
using the case as a way to implement projects without consultation, provinces and
municipalities are going in the opposite direction. Some provinces have enacted statutory
provisions requiring municipalities to consult, and individual municipal initiatives meant to
foster collaborative relationships with Indigenous people are taking place across Canada.
I. WHY THE NESKONLITH DECISION WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
In Neskonlith, the City of Salmon Arm authorized the construction of a shopping mall on
a flood plain. The project was so dangerous that a hazardous development permit was
required pursuant to Part 26 of the British Columbia Local Government Act.4 The Neskonlith
First Nation bordered on the development and sought to quash the permit, as they were

*
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Associate, First Peoples Law, Vancouver, British Columbia.
Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario. This article is written as an initiative
of the Justice and Corporate Accountability Project (justice-project.org). The authors wish to thank
Alexandra Flynn, Associate Professor, University of Toronto, for sharing her expertise on municipal
consultation in Ontario.
2012 BCCA 379 [Neskonlith].
(2014) 47:1 UBC L Rev 293.
Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 [Clyde River]; Chippewas of the
Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41 [Chippewas].
RSBC 1996, c 323, replaced by Municipal Replotting Act, RSBC 2016, c 1.

936

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

(2019) 56:3

concerned with the damage that could result in the event of a flood. The First Nation argued
that the municipality had a duty to consult. They argued that the provincial Crown had
empowered municipalities to make land use decisions, and this delegation of power must
necessarily have been accompanied by the delegation of the Province’s consultation
obligations.
In 2012, the Court of Appeal (per Justice Newbury, with Justices Hall and Smith
concurring) dismissed the Neskonlith First Nation’s claims and held that municipalities do
not have the authority to consult and accommodate First Nations. While the Crown has a
duty to consult, the municipality was not the Crown and did not have such a duty. Further,
the provincial Crown had not expressly delegated consultation obligations to the City of
Salmon Arm. The municipality could therefore proceed with the project without consultation.
The Court emphasized the limited capacity of municipalities to fulfill the duty to consult
and accommodate, noting that municipalities were not granted the remedial powers necessary
to consult and accommodate Aboriginal interests. The Court also noted the practical
challenges faced by municipalities, whose governments range in size and tax base and are
mainly concerned with the regulation of privately-owned land. In the Court’s assessment,
imposing the Crown’s duty to consult on local governments would focus consultation and
accommodation efforts on “mundane decisions” regarding licences, permits, zoning
restrictions, and the like.5 As a result, “[d]aily life would be seriously bogged down if
consultation — including the required ‘strength of claim’ assessment — became necessary
whenever a right or interest of a First Nation ‘might be’ affected.”6
In their 2014 case commentary, Imai and Stacey suggested that the Court of Appeal had
asked the wrong legal question.7 The result of an inquiry into who has the duty to consult
does not also answer the question about whether consultation is necessary before a project
can proceed. These are two separate questions. Irrespective of who must consult, the duty
must be met before a project that actually or potentially infringes Aboriginal rights moves
forward.8
The Court was also wrong about the capacity of municipalities to carry out consultation.
As Imai and Stacey pointed out, all municipalities consult with their citizens on a wide range
of issues.9 In fact, the Court in Neskonlith found that the City of Salmon Arm had carried out
an appropriate level of consultation with the Neskonlith First Nation.10

5
6
7
8
9
10

Neskonlith, supra note 1 at paras 68, 71–72.
Ibid at para 72.
Supra note 2 at 294.
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 67 [Haida].
Imai & Stacey, supra note 2 at 305.
Neskonlith, supra note 1 at para 89.
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In this comment, we argue that both local and provincial governments have important
roles to play in the consultation process. Where municipalities lack the capacity to fully
consult with Indigenous groups, we suggest ways for provinces to work with and assist
municipalities as necessary to fulfill the duty to consult.11 However, regardless of whether
the project proponent is a municipality, a private company, or the Crown, where there has
not been adequate consultation and accommodation, the project cannot proceed.
II. NESKONLITH WOULD CREATE A LEGAL VACUUM
Neskonlith created a legal vacuum regarding fulfillment of the Crown’s constitutional
obligations when local government decisions affect Aboriginal and treaty rights. In the
Court’s reasoning, local governments, by virtue of their legislative authority to proceed with
a project, could freely infringe existing or potential Aboriginal rights without consulting the
affected Indigenous peoples, even when the province had not consulted. This reasoning
would effectively render any consultation efforts by the Crown meaningless. Even if the
Crown determined that some form of accommodation was required to address the potential
infringement of the Aboriginal rights in question before a project proceeded, the project
could continue on the basis that the local decision-maker was not required to consult.
Whether a particular entity has the duty to consult should not be determinative of whether
a project should move forward. Rather, when a project has the potential to affect Aboriginal
rights, meaningful consultation and accommodation is required prior to the project’s
approval.12 If the Crown has failed to adequately discharge its constitutional obligations, then
this precondition for taking action that may affect Aboriginal rights will not have been met,
and the project may not proceed.
We see an illustration of this principle in the case of Ross River Dena Council v.
Government of Yukon.13 In this case, the Yukon Court of Appeal considered the obligation
of the Crown to consult in the context of the “free entry” mining exploration system provided
for in the territorial Quartz Mining Act.14 Under this system, anyone could acquire mineral
rights simply by staking a claim and having it recorded with the Mining Recorder. The
Mining Recorder did not possess the discretion to refuse to record a claim that complied with
the statutory requirements. Rather, its role in recording the mining claim was purely
administrative. Once the mining claim was recorded, the claimant could begin exploration
activities without further authorization or notice to the territorial government. Since a mining
company, as a private body, does not have an independent duty to consult affected
Indigenous people, in Ross River Dena, the question arose as to whether the Crown had such
a duty in these circumstances.

11

12
13
14

In this comment, we only address consultation and accommodation, not consent, because this case
comment is restricted to the duties of municipalities in the context of existing Canadian jurisprudence.
For an overview of arguments on why consent should be required in certain circumstances, see Shin
Imai, “Consult, Consent, and Veto: International Norms and Canadian Treaties” in John Borrows &
Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 370. See also Imai & Stacey, supra note 2, for a further
discussion on opportunities for the provincial and municipal governments to work together to discharge
the duty to consult.
Haida, supra note 8 at para 67.
2012 YKCA 14 [Ross River Dena].
SY 2003, c 14.
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If the Court had followed the reasoning in Neskonlith, it would have asked the wrong
question — did the private mining company have a duty to consult? Since the mining
company was obviously not the Crown, the Court would have found that the company did
not have a duty to consult, and would have permitted the company to go ahead and explore,
even though the Ross River Dena had not been consulted. The Court of Appeal (per Justice
Groberman, with Justices Tysoe and Hinkson concurring), however, asked the right question
— was there a potential impact on Indigenous rights, and if so, had there been appropriate
consultation and accommodation? Having found that no consultation had taken place, the
Court issued a declaration that the legislation be amended to ensure that exploration did not
proceed without appropriate consultation and accommodation.15
As Imai and Stacey have noted, “[t]he fact that a municipality or a private business does
not have the duty to consult does not put them in a better position than the Crown,” in that
a project cannot proceed until consultation and accommodation has occurred.16 The Supreme
Court of Canada’s judgments in the companion appeals of Clyde River and Chippewas
confirm that the duty to consult must be met before a project that has the potential to infringe
Aboriginal and treaty rights may proceed.
In Clyde River and Chippewas, the Supreme Court considered the ability of legislatures
to empower regulatory bodies, here the NEB, to play a role in fulfilling the Crown’s duty to
consult. In Clyde River, the proponents sought and were ultimately granted NEB approval
to conduct offshore seismic testing for oil and gas resources. The Inuit of Clyde River
objected to the testing on the ground that it would negatively impact their harvesting rights.
In Chippewas, the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation challenged the proponent’s
proposal to reverse the flow of an existing pipeline which traversed the Chippewas’
traditional territory. The NEB approved the application, imposing conditions on the project
that required the proponent to address concerns raised by the Chippewas. The Inuit of Clyde
River and the Chippewas each challenged the respective NEB decisions on the basis that the
NEB had no legal authority to approve the projects because the Crown’s duty to consult with
the impacted Indigenous communities had not been adequately discharged.
In both cases, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that the Crown could rely on steps
taken by an administrative body, like the NEB, to partially or completely fulfill its
consultation obligations so long as the administrative body possesses the statutory powers
to do what the duty to consult requires in the circumstances. The Crown, however, retains
ultimate responsibility for ensuring consultation is adequate and must supplement the
measures taken by the regulatory process being relied upon where it does not achieve
adequate consultation or accommodation.17 In Clyde River, the Supreme Court quashed the
NEB’s authorization, concluding that the consultation and accommodation efforts undertaken
by the NEB in that case were inadequate. By contrast, in Chippewas, the Supreme Court
concluded that the NEB’s process was sufficient to satisfy the Crown’s constitutional
obligation to consult.

15

16
17

For a similar case from Ontario’s free entry system, see Wahgoshig First Nation v Ontario, 2011 ONSC
7708. In this case, the mining company refused to consult, and the Court suspended exploratory
activities for 30 days so that consultation and accommodation could take place.
Imai & Stacey, supra note 2 at 300.
Clyde River, supra note 3 at para 22; Chippewas, supra note 3 at paras 32, 37.

TIME TO PUT NESKONLITH TO REST

939

Clyde River and Chippewas support the view that the question to be asked in cases where
the duty to consult arises is always whether the consultation undertaken in the circumstances
was adequate. Any decision affecting Aboriginal rights that is made on the basis of
inadequate consultation will not be in compliance with the duty to consult and, where
challenged on judicial review, should be quashed.18 In Clyde River, the Supreme Court
elaborated as follows:
If the Crown’s duty to consult has been triggered, a decision maker may only proceed to approve a project
if Crown consultation is adequate. Although in many cases the Crown will be able to rely on the NEB’s
processes as meeting the duty to consult, because the NEB is the final decision maker, the key question is
whether the duty is fulfilled prior to project approval.… Accordingly, where the Crown’s duty to consult an
affected Indigenous group with respect to a project … remains unfulfilled, the NEB must withhold project
approval. And, where the NEB fails to do so, its approval decision should … be quashed on judicial review.

19

The duty to consult is a constitutional obligation. It does not depend on whether the
government participates in the consultation process, and it does not disappear when the
Crown acts through a statutory body. Rather, “[i]t must be discharged before the government
proceeds with approval of a project that could adversely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights.”20
The Chippewas and Clyde River decisions provide a clear way out of the legal vacuum
created by Neskonlith, outlining roles for the entities seized with the issue, and a role for the
Crown acting through its departmental representatives. In Part V of this comment, we
provide suggestions on how municipalities and the provincial Crowns can coordinate their
activities to take advantage of both the local knowledge of the municipality and the broader
expertise of the province.
III. WHY THE NESKONLITH DECISION IS
UNWORKABLE ON THE GROUND
In addition to creating a legal void in the application of the Crown’s consultation
obligations, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Neskonlith poses implementation challenges.
While the Crown retains the constitutional imperative to consult, the Crown’s options for
accommodating the Aboriginal rights at stake are severely limited where local decisionmakers are freed from any obligation to consult with affected Indigenous people. For
instance, in situations where the consultation process between the Crown and the affected
Indigenous group reveals significant potential adverse effects on existing or asserted
Aboriginal rights arising in connection with a proposed project, the Crown would not be able
to prevent the municipality from proceeding with the project. The Crown would also be
limited in its ability to offer project alternatives to avoid or mitigate the infringement of the
rights in question. Canadian courts have ruled that, as part of the consultation and
accommodation process, the Crown must demonstrate a willingness to consider and address
Indigenous interests.21 This may require the Crown to change its plans, proposed actions, and

18
19
20
21

Clyde River, ibid at para 24; Chippewas, ibid at para 32.
Clyde River, ibid at para 39 [citations omitted] [emphasis added].
Chippewas, supra note 3 at para 36 [footnotes omitted].
Haida, supra note 8 at para 27.
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policies.22 The Crown’s inability to take these steps in the context of municipal decisions
would effectively render the consultation process meaningless and fall short of the Crown’s
constitutional obligations.
As the Supreme Court of Canada has explained, “the duty to consult and accommodate
is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation.”23 A situation where a municipality may
freely infringe an Indigenous group’s Aboriginal rights simply because it has no obligation
to consult the Indigenous group is much more likely to increase the potential for conflict than
encourage reconciliation. Allowing municipalities to proceed blindly while Indigenous
groups have no effective remedy to address their concerns can also end in physical
confrontations. This was the case in Oka, Quebec in 1990, where a proposal by the mayor
to establish a golf course on land claimed by the Mohawks sparked a 78 day confrontation
between the Canadian army and the Mohawks of Kahnawake.24 Similarly, in 2006, a decision
by the municipality of Haldimand County, in Caledonia, Ontario, permitting a developer to
acquire land claimed by the Six Nations Confederacy for housing development sparked the
Six Nations’ occupation of the site to prevent construction from proceeding. The occupation
turned into a barricaded standoff, which lasted for three months, while the occupation
continued until 2010. The occupation and blockade caused tensions within the local
community, led to physical and verbal confrontations, and resulted in multiple lawsuits. The
dispute was eventually settled when the provincial government purchased the land in issue
from the developer.25
In the spirit of avoiding such conflicts with Indigenous groups, many municipalities are
currently consulting with Indigenous peoples when undertaking activities that are likely to
have an impact on their Aboriginal rights.26 In Neskonlith, for instance, the Court of Appeal
noted that the City of Salmon Arm had taken good faith steps to engage the First Nation in
the process of reviewing the proponent’s development proposal. The Court concluded that,
if the municipality had been required to consult, the steps it took would have fulfilled the
duty:
The Neskonlith were treated respectfully by the City and its staff; they were given copies of all relevant
materials; they were heard at various meetings; their expert reports were obviously reviewed with care by the
owner’s experts; and various modifications, including the reduction of the development to only 20 acres, were
made by Shopping Centres to its plans in the process.

22
23
24

25

26
27

27

Kwikwetlem First Nation v British Columbia (Utilities Commission), 2009 BCCA 68 at para 68.
Haida, supra note 8 at para 32.
Steve Bonspiel, “The Oka Crisis Was Supposed to Be a Wake-Up Call. Little Has Changed in 27
Years,” CBC News (11 July 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/oka-crisis-anniversary1.4197880>; Geoffery York & Loreen Pindera, People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of
Oka (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company (Canada), 1991).
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Chronology of Events at Caledonia” (February 2009), online:
<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016337/1100100016338>; “Buying Caledonia Land Will
Cost Ontario Government $12.3M,” CBC News (23 June 2006), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/toronto/buying-caledonia-land-will-cost-ontario-government-12-3m-1.576496>.
Colleen Sheppard, “Inclusion, Voice, and Process-Based Constitutionalism” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall
LJ 547.
Neskonlith, supra note 1 at para 89.
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There are other examples of municipal governments and Indigenous groups successfully
engaging with one another. At the time the Court of Appeal issued its decision in Neskonlith
in 2012, there were already hundreds of agreements in place between Indigenous
communities and local governments.28 Academics Christopher Alcantara and Jen Nelles have
gathered and analyzed agreements between Indigenous communities and local governments
from across Canada. Their research shows a striking increase in the number of formal
agreements entered into between Indigenous groups and municipal governments “beginning
in the 1980s and accelerating through the 1990s and 2000s.”29 The Court of Appeal’s
decision in Neskonlith does not appear to have done anything to stop these agreements from
continuing to develop. Rather, the trend throughout the current decade shows such
Indigenous-municipal agreements increasing in both frequency and complexity. While
service type agreements, where municipalities provide services to Indigenous communities
in exchange for payment, remain the most popular type of Indigenous-municipal agreement,
Alcantara and Nelles note that agreements focused on building relationships and partnerships
between local governments and Indigenous communities have become the second most
commonly used agreement form.30 All of this suggests that, as a practical matter, agreements
at the local intergovernmental level work and municipalities are not relying on Neskonlith
to ignore their Indigenous neighbours.
Nor has the Neskonlith decision stopped provincial governments from requiring local
governments to consult with Indigenous groups where Aboriginal rights may be affected by
the exercise of their municipal powers.31 For example, Ontario’s 2014 Provincial Policy
Statement under the Planning Act32 requires that the Policy “be implemented in a manner that
is consistent with the recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights in
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982”33 and “recognizes the importance of consulting with
Aboriginal communities on planning matters that may affect their rights and interests.”34 As
well, amendments to Alberta’s Municipal Government Act,35 enacted in June 2017, now
impose consultation requirements on municipalities located adjacent to existing Indian
reserves or Métis settlements.36

28

29
30
31
32
33

34
35
36

See Christopher Alcantara & Jen Nelles, A Quiet Evolution: The Emergence of Indigenous-Local
Intergovernmental Partnerships in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) which provides
an analysis and survey of Indigenous-municipal intergovernmental agreements gathered from across
Canada and a more in-depth review of four particular agreements. See also Ontario, Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and Housing, “Municipal-Aboriginal Relationships: Case Studies” (Toronto: Queen’s
Printer for Ontario, 2009), online: <www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page6054.aspx> which provides examples of
intergovernmental agreements from across Ontario. For a case study, see Clara MacCallum Fraser &
Leela Viswanathan, “The Crown Duty to Consult and Ontario Municipal-First Nations Relations:
Lessons Learned From the Red Hill Valley Parkway Project” (2013) 22:1 Can J Urban Research 1.
Alcantara & Nelles, ibid at 25.
Ibid at 26–28.
See Felix Hoehn & Michael Stevens, “Local Governments and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2018)
55:4 Alta L Rev 971.
RSO 1990, c P-13.
Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Provincial Policy Statement: Under the Planning
Act (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2014) at Policy 4.3, online: <www.mah.gov.on.ca/Asset
Factory.aspx?did=10463> [Provincial Policy Statement].
Ibid at 4.
RSA 2000, c M-26.
Sections 636(1)(g) and (h) of the Municipal Government Act, ibid provide as follows:
(1)While preparing a statutory plan a municipality must
…
(g) in the case of a municipal development plan, notify
(i)the Indian band of any adjacent Indian reserve, or
(ii)any adjacent Metis settlement
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A review of court cases which have considered or applied Neskonlith is another indication
of its negligible impact. Of the cases citing Neskonlith, four only cite the case for the
standard of review,37 two focus on the decision in the context of the Court’s review of
provincial Crown conduct,38 another two cases arise from dissident groups challenging an
existing agreement between a municipality and an Indigenous group,39 one cites the decision
for the legal principle relating to potential grounds for appeals,40 and one case deals with the
Court’s review of a decision by a school board to close schools.41 In other words, there is not
a single case that turns on the fact situation envisioned by Neskonlith, where a municipality
purported to change the use of land without consulting an Indigenous group. The limited
application of this case suggests that municipalities have not been aggressively proceeding
with projects in the face of Indigenous concerns, and may even be evidence of increasing
cooperation between local governments and the Indigenous groups potentially impacted by
their activities.
IV. THE ROLE OF MUNICIPALITIES IN DISCHARGING THE
DUTY TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE
In deciding the appeals in Clyde River and Chippewas, the Supreme Court of Canada
considered and clarified the nature of the Crown and its role in fulfilling the duty to consult
in relation to the NEB. While the NEB could fulfill some of the duties to consult and
accommodate, it was also limited by its statutory mandate. In this section we argue that the
relationship between the Crown and municipalities is analogous to that between the Crown
and the NEB.
A.

WHAT IS THE OVERALL ROLE OF THE CROWN IN CONSULTATION?

The Crown is ultimately responsible for satisfying the duty to consult. However, as
explained above, where the duty to consult is triggered, the Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed that the Crown may rely on a regulatory agency’s process to fulfill its duty to
consult in whole or in part and, where appropriate, accommodate. Whether a regulatory
agency’s process is sufficient to meet the duty to consult will depend on whether the body
has sufficient statutory duties and powers to provide an appropriate level of consultation and
accommodation to the affected Indigenous peoples in the circumstances. As ultimate
responsibility for ensuring the consultation is adequate remains with the Crown, if the

37

38
39
40
41

of the plan preparation and provide opportunities to that Indian band or Metis settlement
to make suggestions and representations, and
(h) in the case of an area structure plan, where the land that is the subject of the plan is
adjacent to an Indian reserve or Metis settlement, notify the Indian band or Metis
settlement of the plan preparation and provide opportunities for that Indian band or
Metis settlement to make suggestions and representations.
Cold Lake First Nations v Alberta (Tourism, Parks and Recreation), 2013 ABCA 443 at para 38;
Nunatsiavut Government v Canada (Department of Fisheries and Oceans), 2015 FC 492 at para 109;
Prophet River First Nation v British Columbia (Environment), 2017 BCCA 58 at para 49; West Moberly
First Nations v British Columbia (Energy and Mines), 2014 BCSC 924 at para 8.
Halalt First Nation v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 472; Squamish Nation v British Columbia
(Community, Sport and Cultural Development), 2014 BCSC 991.
Smerek v Areva Resources Canada Inc, 2014 SKQB 282; McClung v Haudenosaunee, 2016 ONSC
1733.
Wang v Grace Canada Inc, 2018 BCCA 255 at para 29.
Snuneymuxw First Nation v Board of Education — School District #68, 2014 BCSC 1173.
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regulatory process relied on does not achieve adequate consultation or accommodation, the
Crown must take further measures to fulfill the duty.42
The Supreme Court further explained that the regulatory processes relied on to fulfill the
Crown’s consultation obligations need not be specifically tailored to consultation with
Indigenous peoples. Rather, processes originally designed for a different purpose may still
be relied on by the Crown to fulfill the duty to consult, “so long as [the process] affords an
appropriate level of consultation to the affected Indigenous group.”43 The regulatory body
must have both the procedural powers necessary to implement consultation, and the remedial
powers to accommodate affected Indigenous claims or Aboriginal rights.44
B.

WHAT ENTITIES CARRY OUT THE ROLE OF THE CROWN?

The Supreme Court also clarified how the NEB’s decision qualified as Crown conduct
triggering the Crown’s duty to consult. In Clyde River, the Supreme Court explained the role
of the NEB vis-à-vis the Crown as follows:
[T]he NEB is not, strictly speaking, “the Crown”. Nor is it, strictly speaking, an agent of the Crown, since
— as the NEB operates independently of the Crown’s ministers — no relationship of control exists between
them.… As a statutory body holding responsibility under s. 5(1)(b) of [the Canada Oil and Gas Operations
45

Act ], however, the NEB acts on behalf of the Crown when making a final decision on a project application.
Put plainly, once it is accepted that a regulatory agency exists to exercise executive power as authorized by
legislatures, any distinction between its actions and Crown action quickly falls away. In this context, the NEB
is the vehicle through which the Crown acts.… It therefore does not matter whether the final decision maker
on a resource project is Cabinet or the NEB. In either case, the decision constitutes Crown action that may
46

trigger the duty to consult.

The NEB is a statutory body with delegated executive responsibility to make decisions that
could adversely affect Aboriginal rights. In both Clyde River and Chippewas, the NEB acted
on the Crown’s behalf in approving each proponent’s application. Because the projects in
issue in each case had the potential to adversely affect the Aboriginal rights of the appellant
Indigenous groups, the Crown had an obligation to consult with respect to the proponents’
applications.47 Therefore, in each case, the NEB’s approval process itself was the Crown
action that triggered the Crown’s duty to consult. This was the case notwithstanding the fact
that the Crown was not a party to the regulatory process.48

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Clyde River, supra note 3 at para 22.
Ibid at para 31 [citations omitted].
Ibid at paras 31–32, 34.
RSC 1985, c O-7.
Clyde River, supra note 3 at para 29 [citations omitted].
Chippewas, supra note 3 at para 31.
Clyde River, supra note 3 at para 29.
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APPLICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MUNICIPALITIES

The reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Clyde River and Chippewas helps
address the concerns raised by the Court of Appeal in Neskonlith regarding the role of
municipalities in discharging the duty to consult. In Clyde River, the Supreme Court noted
that statutory bodies, like the NEB, were neither the Crown nor agents of the Crown.
However, such statutory bodies, with delegated executive responsibility to make final
decisions on project applications, acted on behalf of the Crown when exercising this
responsibility. In the cases of Clyde River and Chippewas, the NEB became “the vehicle
through which the Crown acts” and its decision, undertaken in accordance with its delegated
authority, constituted “Crown action that may trigger the duty to consult.”49
Similarly, municipalities are creatures of statute with the legislated authority and
responsibility to make certain final decisions. In making these decisions, municipalities act
on behalf of the Crown, and such decisions become Crown action subject to the Crown’s
consultation obligations. Where such decisions have the potential to affect Aboriginal title
and rights, the Crown’s duty to consult is triggered. In these circumstances, the
municipalities should be required to ensure the duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous
people respecting their concerns has been sufficiently discharged before proceeding with a
decision or activity.
Municipalities should engage in consultation with affected Indigenous groups regardless
of whether it is a legislative requirement of the governing statute. Where the consultation
efforts undertaken by the municipalities are insufficient, or where municipalities lack the
remedial powers to adequately accommodate Indigenous concerns, then the provincial
Crown must take further steps to ensure the duty to consult is properly discharged.
Felix Hoen and Michael Stevens suggest that the powers delegated to local governments
in modern day life are the same as those assumed by the Crown over lands formerly
controlled by Indigenous peoples.50 For this reason, local governments should exercise their
powers in a manner consistent with the honour of the Crown and comply with the Crown’s
duty to consult.
In coming to this conclusion, Hoehn and Stevens draw comparisons between the
application of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the application of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms51 to municipalities. Courts have consistently found
municipalities to be bound by the Charter, despite the fact that they are not identified in
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section 32(1) of the Charter.52 As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Godbout v.
Longueuil (City),53
interpreting s. 32 as including governmental entities other than those explicitly listed therein is entirely
sensible from a practical perspective. Were the Charter to apply only to those bodies that are institutionally
part of government but not to those that are — as a simple matter of fact — governmental in nature (or
performing a governmental act), the federal government and the provinces could easily shirk their Charter
obligations by conferring certain of their powers on other entities and having those entities carry out what are,
in reality, governmental activities or policies.… Clearly, this course of action would indirectly narrow the
ambit of protection afforded by the Charter in a manner that could hardly have been intended and with
54

consequences that are, to say the least, undesirable.

The Supreme Court in Godbout concluded that Charter rights were so fundamentally
important that they required safeguard from possible attempts to unduly narrow their scope
or circumvent their obligations.55 According to Hoehn and Stevens, this same logic should
require municipalities to act in a manner consistent with section 35 of the Constitution Act,
198256 and the constitutional duty to consult.
Both the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Clyde River and Chippewas and
the rationale provided by Hoehn and Stevens point to municipalities being some sort of
emanation of the Crown and therefore bound by the Crown’s duty to consult to the extent
that municipal legislation permits.
However, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that municipalities are not
emanations of the Crown, but rather corporate “creatures of statute” unrelated to the Crown,
we would still conclude that municipal projects could not proceed until consultation and
accommodation had first taken place. If municipal corporations, like business corporations,
are “creatures of statute” independent of the Crown, they arguably have no duty to consult.
However, as confirmed in Ross River Dena, and hundreds of other duty to consult cases,
business corporations are not permitted to proceed with their proposed activity until the
Crown has fulfilled its obligations to consult and accommodate. It would be very odd to
allow municipal corporations, in their capacity as corporations, to proceed with a project
without any consultation, while prohibiting business corporations from doing so.
In conclusion, it seems clear to us that municipalities must take on the responsibility of
consulting Indigenous people impacted by their development activities. If they are unable to
fulfill this responsibility adequately, the Crown must step in. In either case, the municipality
cannot proceed with a project until the duty to consult has been fulfilled.
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V. HOW CAN WE COORDINATE MUNICIPAL CONSULTATION
WITH PROVINCIAL CROWN RESPONSIBILITY?
While the Court of Appeal in Neskonlith emphasized the “mundane” administrative nature
of decisions made by municipal governments, the reality is that these decisions often have
very real, and usually immediate, consequences for the people affected by them, including
Indigenous people. Given the legal and practical implications of municipalities not consulting
with potentially impacted Indigenous groups, we propose that it is in the best interest of all
parties involved for a space to be carved out for municipal participation in the consultation
process.
A.

MUNICIPALITIES SHOULD LEAD CONSULTATION
AND ACCOMMODATION, BUT THE PROVINCIAL CROWN

SHOULD SUPPLEMENT AS NECESSARY
In justifying the ability of regulatory bodies to fulfill the Crown’s duty to consult, the
Supreme Court in Clyde River took special note of the NEB’s institutional expertise in
undertaking consultation and in assessing the environmental impacts of proposed projects,
concluding as follows:
Where the effects of a proposed project on Aboriginal or treaty rights substantially overlap with the project’s
potential environmental impact, the NEB is well situated to oversee consultations which seek to address these
57

effects, and to use its technical expertise to assess what forms of accommodation might be available.

Municipalities likewise have specific expertise that may make them better suited to fulfill
certain aspects of the duty to consult and accommodate in respect of local matters. As the
Neskonlith First Nation argued before the Court of Appeal:
Local governments, as the decision-makers regarding land use decisions that could affect the exercise of
Aboriginal Title and Rights, are in the best position to engage in the consultation process. They are located
in the area where the proposed development is proposed to take place and have a better understanding of the
local circumstances than centralized governments.

58

The Court of Appeal in Neskonlith ultimately dismissed the Neskonlith First Nation’s
argument in this regard, concluding that the limitations of municipalities in fulfilling the
requirements of consultation outweighed the benefits of extending some aspect of the
obligation to them. However, the fact remains that, notwithstanding the Crown’s ability to
rely on regulatory, or, as we argue in this comment, municipal, processes to fulfill its
consultation obligations, the Crown retains ultimate responsibility for ensuring the adequacy
of consultation. Therefore, the question of whether a municipal process is sufficient to
discharge the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate is one to be determined by the
Crown on a case-by-case basis. As with regulatory processes, where consultation processes
undertaken by a municipality do not achieve adequate consultation or accommodation, the
Crown will be expected to take further measures to meet the duty. As noted in Clyde River,
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this may require the Crown to make submissions to the statutory body, request
reconsideration of a decision, or seek a postponement to allow further consultation in a
separate process, or it may require the Crown to pursue legislative or regulatory
amendments.59
It would likely not be efficient for every proposal by every municipality to be approved
or reviewed by a central agency in the provincial government. We therefore suggest that
municipalities work with affected Indigenous groups to conduct an initial assessment of the
municipality’s capabilities to undertake consultation with the affected Indigenous groups,
and that they contact the provincial government for assistance or support as required. In this
way, project proposals that are at the lower end of the consultation spectrum could be
undertaken between municipalities and impacted Indigenous communities without provincial
involvement. Such a formalized process between local and provincial governments would
not prejudice Indigenous groups because the overall responsibility of the provincial Crown
would not change. All that would happen is that there would be a more efficient and
transparent sharing of the consultation activities between the province and the municipality.
We can see how these consultation issues played out in a case decided by the Ontario
Municipal Board (OMB) shortly after Clyde River and Chippewas were decided. In Burleigh
Bay Corporation v. North Kawartha (Township),60 the defendant township turned down an
application for the development of a condominium complex in Ontario. The developer
appealed the rejection to the OMB. The OMB was required to determine whether the
proposed development was consistent with Ontario’s Provincial Policy Statement, which
includes requirements to consider the cultural and heritage interests of local Aboriginal
people.61 A local First Nation participated in the hearing, raising concerns about the potential
impacts of the development on its archaeological sites and artifacts and the lack of
consultation respecting the development.
The OMB dismissed the application on other grounds, but found that consultation was
adequate in this case. In considering the duty to consult issue, the OMB attempted to follow
the analysis set out in the Chippewas case. The Board reviewed the consultation undertaken
by the developer itself, and also the fact that the local First Nation was given participant
status in the hearings before the OMB. Taking into account the degree of impact on the
interests of the First Nation, the OMB found that deep consultation was not necessary, and
that the requirement for consultation had been fulfilled.62 The adequacy of the consultation
and accommodation by the township was not in issue in this case because the township
opposed the development as well. However, had the township favoured the development, the
OMB would have had a framework to evaluate the adequacy of the consultation and
accommodation undertaken by the township in deciding whether the duty to the First Nation
had been fulfilled. If the OMB had found that the consultation and accommodation process
was inadequate because the participation of the provincial Crown was required, the Board
could have refused to allow the project to proceed until the Crown had stepped in to
supplement the steps already taken.
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MUNICIPALITIES CAN BE DIRECTED TO DISCHARGE
THE DUTY TO CONSULT THROUGH LEGISLATION,

POLICY, OR IN PRACTICE
In Part III of this article, we outlined a number of ways that consultation by municipalities
can be addressed. In Alberta, the Municipal Government Act specifically requires
municipalities to allow Indian bands and Métis communities the opportunity to make
suggestions and representations in the planning context.63 In Ontario, the Provincial Policy
Statement recognizes the importance of consultations by municipalities on planning
matters.64 Finally, the work of Alcantara and Nelles documents hundreds of agreements
entered into between municipalities and Indigenous peoples.65 In our view, all of these
methods are legitimate bases for consultation by municipalities, and all are currently being
utilized.
Collaboration between provinces, municipalities, and Indigenous peoples can be
facilitated by having provinces and Indigenous communities provide education and training
to municipalities on ways to recognize potential issues and interact with their Indigenous
neighbours. For instance, Indigenous governments may have their own consultation and
engagement protocols in place, which they can share with municipalities to help guide these
interactions and facilitate discussions. In other circumstances, Indigenous communities and
municipalities could work together to develop their own engagement framework based on
their specific priorities. Other initiatives could also support municipal-Indigenous
consultation processes. In Ontario, for example, the Shared Path Consultation Initiative, a
grassroots organization training First Nations and municipal staff on how to conduct
meaningful and respectful consultation, serves as an example of the potential for multigovernment collaboration.66 Whatever model is developed, provinces should make clear what
services they will provide to municipalities, taking into account the size and capacity of the
municipality involved. For instance, larger municipalities may be expected to maintain a
greater degree of responsibility for the consultation and accommodation process than smaller
municipalities.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have argued that Neskonlith was wrong in law in that it focused on whether the
municipality had a duty to consult, and not on whether appropriate consultation and
accommodation had taken place. Like private corporations, municipalities should not be
permitted to proceed with activities that have the potential to affect the rights of Indigenous
people unless the Crown has first fulfilled its duty to consult. In our opinion, the Supreme
Court of Canada’s reasoning in Clyde River and Chippewas rejects the suggestion by the
Court of Appeal in Neskonlith that Indigenous peoples potentially impacted by decisions of
local government should seek recourse for the Crown’s failure to consult in some other
forum. In Clyde River, the Supreme Court of Canada made clear that “judicial review is no
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substitute for adequate consultation.”67 Consultation is meant to achieve reconciliation
between the Crown and Indigenous peoples, and “[t]rue reconciliation is rarely, if ever,
achieved in courtrooms.”68
We have also shown that Neskonlith could not be implemented on the ground, and that in
practice, it has had only a tangential impact on what municipalities actually do. It simply is
not practical for local governments to ignore the interests of their Indigenous neighbours.
Municipalities should facilitate consultation and accommodation within their jurisdictions.
However, the provincial Crown may be required to supplement these activities where a
municipality’s resources are limited and the matter calls for additional expertise. Ultimately,
a coordinated municipal-provincial approach to consulting Indigenous groups on local
matters that have the potential to affect their rights is the most efficient way to proceed.
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